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DISSING DISABILITIES: A STUDENT'S DUTY 
To MITIGATE MALADIES 
J. J. Knauff 
Di Sabled, a law student, requests accommodation under 
the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). Di suffers from a 
minor case of carpal tunnel syndrome (CTS)1 and lazy-
graphia2-the combination of which make her handwriting al-
most illegible. Throughout her undergraduate career, Di took 
mitigating measures to help keep her up in class. She wore cor-
rective splints to alleviate the symptoms of CTS, and she de-
veloped study habits that allowed her to overcome her writing 
difficulties. Di took her Law School Aptitude Test (LSAT) with-
out accommodations, scored a 150, and was accepted to Aco 
Modate U. School of Law. After her first semester at Aco Mo-
date U., Di scored poorly on her exams and feared that she 
might fail out of school. She talked to her dean and presented a 
letter from her personal doctor attesting to her disabilities and 
requesting the accommodation of extra time on her second se-
mester exams. The dean approved her accommodation, and Di 
received an extra two hours per exam. With the extra time, Di 
excelled on her tests. In fact, her high second semester scores 
raised her cumulative grade-point-average (GPA) to the top 
15% of her class, thereby meeting the grade-on requirements of 
Aco Modate U. School of Law Law Review. Was the ADA en-
acted to give average students the opportunity to excel beyond 
their aptitude levels? How can schools combat the misuse of the 
ADA by students with correctable impairments? 
* B.A.S., Texas Tech University; J.D., Texas Wesleyan University. I would like 
to thank Professors Stephen Alton, Lynn Rambo and Joe Spurlock II, as well as my 
parents, Jerry and Phyllis Knauff. 
1. See TABER'S CYCLOPEDIC MEDICAL DICTIONARY 323 (18" ed. 1997) (stating 
carpal tunnel syndrome causes a numbness or pain in the wrist or hand and that rest-
ing the wrist, using a splint, and the use of nonsteroidal anti-inflammatory drugs can 
eliminate the symptoms) [hereinafter TABER'S]. 
2. Sloppy handwriting (a term coined by the author). 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
In 1990, Congress enacted the Americans with Disabilities 
Act (ADA) to level the playing field for the more than forty-
three million Americans with physical or mental disabilities.3 
The ADA prohibits discrimination by covered entities, includ-
ing post-graduate schools, from discriminating against quali-
fied disabled individuals.4 
In the last few years, individuals seeking accommodation 
for more time on admissions exams has more than doubled. 5 
For example, between 1990 and 1993, the number of learning 
disabled individuals taking the LSAT under special conditions 
increased from 261 to 553.6 Also, the learning disabled ac-
counted for approximately 60% of the total number of accom-
modated LSAT test takers. 7 Correlatively, law schools' disabled 
student accommodations have also increased. 
An Association of American Law Schools (AALS) survel 
indicated that among the categories of handicapping condi-
tions, learning disabilities9 contained the largest number of 
students. 1° Further, a 1992 American Council on Education 
study revealed that one in eleven college freshmen reported 
3. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a) (1999) (showing Congress' findings regarding the 
disabled and stating Congress' purposes in passing the ADA). See also Timothy Stew-
art Bland, The Determination of Disability Under The ADA: Should Mitigating Factors 
Such As Medications Be Considered?, 35 IDAHO L. REV. 265, 267 (1999) (noting that 
Congress was concerned with the unequal treatment of persons with disabilities). 
4. See 42 U.S. C. § 12181 (7)(j) (1999) and 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (1999). 
5. See Lisa Eichorn, Reasonable Accommodations and Awkward Compromises: 
Issues Concerning Learning Disabled Students and Professional Schools in the Law 
School Context, 26 J.L. & EDUC. 31 (1997). 
6. See Linda F. Wightman, Test Takers with Disabilities: A Summary of Data 
From Special Administrations of the LSAT, in LAS School Admission Council Research 
Report 93-03 (Dec. 1993) at 12 (available from Law Service, Newtown, Pennsylvania). 
See also Eichorn, supra note 5, at 31. 
7. See Wightman, supra note 6. 
8. SeeM. Kay Runyan and Joseph F. Smith, Jr., Identifying and Accommodating 
Learning Disabled Law School Students, 41 J. LEGAL EDUC. 317, 340 (1991) (noting 
that 86.3% of 147 law schools responded to the survey with information about types of 
student disabilities, types of accommodations, and guidelines regarding accommoda-
tions). 
9. See TABER'S, supra note 1, at 560 (defining learning disability as a disorder of 
academic functioning that is marked by difficulties in learning that are far greater 
than would be expected for the person's age and measured intelligence). 
10. See Runyan, supra note 8, at 320 (referring to the 1989-1990 AALS survey of 
175 AHA-approved law schools which found that 235 of the 725 identified disabled stu-
dents were learning disabled). 
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having a disability compared with one in thirty-eight in 1978.11 
This study also showed that disabled enrollment has more than 
tripled during that same period of time. 12 In addition, learning 
disabled adults reportedly are the fastest growing group of col-
lege and university students today. 13 Law school accommoda-
tion incidences will likely increase as these university students 
graduate and seek post-secondary education. Thus, law schools 
should review their learning disability policies to prevent stu-
dents having medical or physical "disabilities" that can be 
mitigated14 without invoking the ADA to acquire special ac-
commodations. 
After discussing the statutory background and legislative 
history, key terms, and mitigating cases concerning the ADA, 
this article will show that the ADA guidelines need to be 
changed as they pertain to certain "disabilities" that can be 
corrected, including, but not limited to, Attention Deficit Disor-
der (ADD)/5 Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder 
(ADHD)/6 Carpal Tunnel Syndrome (CTS), 17 Disorder of Writ-
ten Expression (DWE), 18 Dysgraphia,19 and Dyslogia.20 Next, 
11. See Diana C. Pullin and Kevin J. Heaney, The Use of"Flagged" Test Scores in 
College and University Admissions: Issues and Implications under Section 504 of the 
Rehabilitation Act and the Americans with Disabilities Act, 23 J.C. & U.L. 797 (1997). 
12. See Claire E. McCusker, The Americans with Disabilities Act: Its Potential for 
Expanding the Scope of Reasonable Academic Accommodations, 21 J.C. & U.L. 619, 620 
(stating that 2.6% of college freshman reported a disability in 1978, whereas 8.8% of 
college freshman reported a disability in 1991). 
13. See Pullin, supra note 11, at 797. 
14. See, e.g., BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1002 (6th ed. 1990) (stating that mitiga-
tion means "to make [something] less severe"); WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD DICTIONARY 
911 (2d ed. 1986) (defining mitigation as making something less severe, less rigorous, 
or less painful). 
15. See Maria L. Chang, Feeling Blue? Chemicals in Our Brains, and Controver-
sial New Drugs, Can Change Our Moods and Emotions, SCI. WORLD, October 6, 1997, 
at 12 (showing that the drug Ritalin is used to treat ADD). See also TABER'S, supra 
note 1, at 1205 (stating methylphenidate hydrochloride [Ritalin] is used in treating 
ADD). 
16. See, e.g., Price v. National Bd. ofMed. Exam'rs, 966 F.Supp. 419, 422 (stating 
the essential feature of ADHD is a persistent pattern of inattention and/or hyperactiv-
ity-impulsivity); TABER'S, supra note 1, at 172-73 (describing ADHD as a disorder 
marked by inattention, hyperactivity, and/or impulsivity). 
17. See TABER'S, supra note 1, at 323 (defining carpal tunnel syndrome and dis-
cussing treatment). 
18. See Phyllis G. Coleman et al., Law Students and the Disorder of Written Ex-
pression, 26 J.L. & EDUC. 1 (1997) (stating that the essential feature of DWE is writing 
skills that fall substantially below those expected given the individual's chronological 
age, measured intelligence, and age-appropriate education). 
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this article will explore the Tenth Circuit's recent decision in 
McGuinness v. University of New Mexico School of Medicine 21 
as it relates to the United States Supreme Court's decisions in 
Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 22 Murphy v. United Parcel Ser-
vice, Inc., 23 and New York State Board of Law Examiners v. 
Bartlett. 24 Finally, this article will propose different remedies 
that schools should implement to allow parity between the 
learning disabled and non-accommodated students. 
II. STATUTORY BACKGROUND AND LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 
Like prior civil rights legislation, the ADA marshals Con-
gressional authority, executive branch agency resources, and 
judiciary power to eliminate discrimination against disabled 
individuals.25 Furthermore, Congress passed the ADA to give 
the disabled "equality of opportunity, full participation, inde-
pendent living, and economic self-sufficiency."26 The ADA pro-
vides sweeping civil rights protection to disabled individuals. 
The three major ADA titles apply to employment (Title 1), state 
and local public services (Title II), and ~ublic accommodations 
provided by private entities (Title Ill). 2 Title II's reference to 
state public services makes it applicable to public schools, and 
Title III's reference to private entities makes it applicable to 
private schools. 
Three government agencies share the authority to imple-
ment the ADA The Supreme Court, in a recent case, defined 
this division of authority: 
19. Bad handwriting. See e.g., Ruth Shalit, Defining Disability Down: Why 
Johnny Can't Read, Write, or Sit Still, NEW REPUBLIC at 8, August 25, 1997 (describing 
dysgraphia as a disorder of written expression); TABER'S, supra note 1, at 587 (likening 
dysgraphia to writer's cramp). 
20. See TABER'S, supra note 1, at 588 (describing dyslogia as a difficulty in ex-
pressing ideas). 
21. 170 F.3d 974 (10'" Cir. 1998) cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 1357 (1999). 
22. 119 S.Ct. 2139 (1999). 
23. !d. at 2133. 
24. 156 F.3d 321, 329 (2d Cir. 1998). 
25. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1) (1999); Mark D. Laponsky, Dejinin;; "Disabil-
ity:" A Look at the Term Within the Context of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 39 
FED. B. NEWS & J. 44 (1992). 
26. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(8) (1999). 
27. See Laura F. Rothstein, Bar Admissions and the Americans with Disabilities 
Act, Hous. LAW., Sept.-Oct. 1994, at 34, 36 (discussing general issues as related to ac-
commodations on the bar exam). 
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The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) has 
the authority to issue regulations to carry out the employ-
ment provisions in Title I of the ADA. .. [t]he Attorney Gen-
eral is granted authority to issue regulations with respect to 
Title II, subtitle A, which relates to public services ... [and] 
the Secretary of Transportation has authority to issue regula-




Previous civil rights legislation extended protection against 
discrimination on the basis of readily identifiable characteris-
tics, such as race and sex.29 Unfortunately, individuals with 
disabilities, especially those who are learning disabled,30 are 
not easily identifiable. 31 Also, although the ADA seems to set 
forth a comprehensive scheme for determining if an individual 
is disabled, it fails to define the major phrases critical to un-
derstand the nature of an ADA disability. 32 
III. KEY TERMS 
Any discussion of the ADA requires an understanding of the 
key terminology used in the Act. The threshold issue in every 
ADA case is whether the individual bringing the suit is "dis-
abled" within the meaning of the statute.33 The ADA defines 
the term "disability" as, "(A) a physical or mental impairment 
that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities 
of such individual; (B) a record of such an impairment; or (C) 
being regarded as having such an impairment."34 According to 
Title II of the ADA, "no qualified individual with a disability 
shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from participa-
tion in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or 
activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by 
28. Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 119 S. Ct. 2139, 2144-45 (1999). 
29. Laponsky, supra note 12, at 45. 
30. See McCusker, supra note 25, at 621 (stating that learning disabilities are 
known as invisible disabilities). 
31. See Laponsky, supra note 25, at 45. 
32. See Price v. National Bd. of Med. Exam'rs, 966 F.Supp. 419, 424 (S.D.W.V. 
1997) (stating the ADA does not define the phrases "physical or mental impairment," 
"substantially limits," and "major life activities"). See also Laponsky, supra note 25, at 
45 (noting that the meaning of disability is unclear). 
33. See 42 U.S. C. § 12112 (1999). See also Bland, supra note 3, at 268 (noting the 
threshold issue for bringing an ADA case is being "disabled"). 
34. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (1999). 
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any such entity."35 
A. A Physical or Mental Impairment 
When Congress passed the ADA, it neither defined nor 
enumerated the phrase "a physical or mental impairment."36 
However, the EEOC issued regulations to provide guidance re-
garding the proper interpretation of this term. Under the regu-
lations, a "physical impairment" includes 
any physiological disorder, or condition, cosmetic disfigure-
ment, or anatomical loss affecting one or more of the following 
body systems: neurological, musculoskeletal, special sense or-
gans, respiratory (including speech organs), cardiovascular, 
reproductive, digestive, genito-urinary, hemic and lymphatic, 
skin, and endocrine, ... or any mental or psychological disor-
der, ... emotional or mental illness, and specific learning dis-
b .1. . 37 a 1 1bes. 
Unfortunately, the ADA does not define the term "specific 
learning disability." However, Congress considered the issue of 
learning disabilities when it passed the Individuals with Dis-
abilities Education Act (IDEA).38 Thus, IDEA offers guidance as 
to the general legal boundaries of learning disabilities and 
should be used to interpret the term.39 This act states that a 
learning disability is "a disorder in one or more of the basic 
psychological processes involved in understanding or in using 
language, spoken or written, that may manifest itself in an im-
perfect ability to listen, think, speak, read, write, spell, or to do 
mathematical calculations."40 
B. Substantially Limits 
The term "substantially limits" is ambiguous,41 but the 
35. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (1999); McGuinness v. University of New Mexico 
Sch. ofMed., 170 F.3d 974,978 (lOth Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 119 S.Ct. 1357 (1999). 
36. See, e.g., Price, 966 F.Supp. at 424; Bartlett v. New York Bd. of Law Exam'rs, 
156 F.3d 321, 327 (2d Cir. 1998), vacated by, 119 S.Ct. 2388 (1999); Kevin H. Smith, 
Disabilities, Law Schools, and Law Students: A Proactive and Holistic Approach, 32 
AKRON L. REV. 1, 42 (1999). 
37. Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2145. See also 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h) (1999). 
38. See 20 U.S.C.A. § 1400(a) (1999). See also Eichhorn, supra note 5, at 40. 
39. See Eichorn, supra note 5, at 40. 
40. 34 C.F.R. § 300.7(a)(10) (2000). 
41. See, e.g., Price, 966 F.Supp. at 424 (finding that the ADA does not define the 
critical term "substantially limits," and thus it is open to judicial interpretation); Adam 
A. Milani, Disabled Students in Higher Education: Administrative and Judicial En· 
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regulations promulgated by the EEOC under the ADA provide 
significant guidance. The regulations state that "substantially 
limits" means "unable to perform a major life activity that the 
average person in the general population can perform."42 Also, 
the determination of whether an impairment is substantially 
limiting accounts for, "(1) the nature and severity of the im-
pairment, (2) the duration or expected duration of their im-
pairment, and (3) the permanent or long term impact or ex-
pected impact or long term impact of or resulting from the 
. . t ,43 1mpmrmen. 
In light of the EEOC guidelines, the Supreme Court held 
that the term "substantially limits" should be read "as requir-
ing that a person be presently-not potentially or hypotheti-
cally-substantially limited in order to demonstrate a disabil-
ity."44 Furthermore, the Court stated that a person whose 
physical or mental impairment is corrected by medication or 
other measures does not have an impairment that presently 
"substantially limits" a major life activity. 45 A person with an 
impairment who has been corrected by mitigating measures, 
such as eyeglasses or medication, still has an impairment; 
however, the impairment is hypothetical46 because it does not 
presently affect that person, thus she is not to be regarded as 
being "substantially limited" in a major life activity. 47 
forcement of Disability Law, 22 J.C. & U.L. 989, 989 (1996) (stating that the impreci-
sion of ADA phrases is a source offrustration for both administrators and students). 
42. See, e.g., 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(l)(i) (2000) (defining "substantially limits"); 
Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2146-47; Soileau v. Guilford of Maine, Inc., 105 F.3d 12 (1st Cir. 
1997) (holding that an impairment is to be measured against what the average person 
does); Gonzalez v. National Bd. of Med. Exam'rs, 60 F. Supp. 2d 703, 705 (E. D. Mich. 
1999) (finding that average, or even slightly below average, is not disabled for purposes 
of the ADA). 
43. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.21j)(2) (2000). See also Talk v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 165 F.3d 
1021, 1024 (5th Cir. 1999). 
44. Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2146. 
45. ld. at 2146-47. 
46. See, e.g., 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(2)(iii) (2000); Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2146; 
Gutridge v. Clure, 153 F. 3d 898, 901 (8th Cir. 1998) (stating the ADA requires perma-
nent or long-term impairments); Heintzelman v. Runyon, 120 F.3d 143, 145 (8th Cir. 
1997) (finding "temporary, non-chronic impairments of short duration, with little or no 
long term or permanent impact, are usually not disabilities"); Rothstein, supra note 27, 
at 36 (stating that individuals with certain emotional problems, such as stress, chronic 
lateness, and test phobia often have been treated as not being covered by discrimina-
tion statutes because their impairments do not substantially interfere with major life 
activities). 
47. Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2147. 
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C. Major Life Activity 
The term "major life activity" means "functions such as car-
ing for oneself, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, 
hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and working."48 Major 
life activities are to be viewed narrowly. 49 For example, plain-
tiffs must allege that they are unable to work in a broad class 
of jobs when they claim to be limited in the major life activity of 
working.50 The EEOC requirements state that "the inability to 
perform a single, particular job does not constitute a substan-
tial limitation in the major life activity of working."51 The 
EEOC regulation's definition of substantial limitation on 
"working" is similar to the deciding principles of employment 
discrimination cases. By analogy, the EEOC re¥ulations can 
apply to ADA claims in the educational context.5 Therefore, a 
student must demonstrate that her learning disability impedes 
her performance in a wide variety of disciplines. 53 
D. Qualified Individual 
Under the ADA, a student with a disability does not auto-
matically qualify for an accommodation on an examination, 
special consideration during the admissions process, or accom-
modations in programs or services after admission.54 Rather, a 
student must show that she is a "qualified individual with a 
disability."55 Thus, under Title II, a "qualified individual" is 
someone with a disability who, with or without reasonable 
modification, meets the essential eligibility requirements to re-
ceive public services or participate in a public program.56 In 
other words, a "qualified individual with a disability" is some-
48. See also 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i) (1999). 
49. See Sutton, 199 S. Ct. at 2149. 
50. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3)(i) (1999) (stating the inability to perform a single, 
particular job does not constitute a substantial limitation in the major life activity of 
working). See also Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2151 (holding that if a host of different types of 
jobs are available then one is not precluded from a broad range of jobs). 
51. Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2151. 
52. McGuinness, 170 F.3d at 978. 
53. See id. See also Betts v. University of Virginia, No. 97-1850, slip op. at 13 (4th 
Cir. Sept. 22, 1999) (stating that plaintiff may have a learning disorder that "substan-
tially limits" his ability to attend medical school, but that attending medical school is 
not a "major life activity"). 
54. See Pullin, supra note 11, at 804. 
55. Id. 
56. McGuinness, 170 F.3d at 978. 
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one who meets all program requirements in spite of her handi-
57 
cap. 
E. Reasonable Accommodations 
A "reasonable accommodation" makes existing facilities 
readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabili-
ties.58 Title III of the ADA explicitly outlines examples of ac-
commodations that must be given. Reasonable accommodations 
include changes in the length of time for completion of the ex-
amination and adaptation of the manner in which the exami-
nation is given. 59 Furthermore, Title III requires taped exami-
nations, interpreters, or other effective methods of making 
orally delivered material available to individuals with hearing 
impairments. For individuals with visual impairments or 
learning disabilities, Title III also requires the availability of 
Braille or large grint examinations and answer sheets, or 
qualified readers. Other accommodations for physical disabili-
ties include wheel chair access, table height adaptations, and 
extra time for rest breaks.61 
Title III regulations discuss examinations and provide that 
any private entity who offers an examination must ensure that: 
The examination is selected and administered so as to best 
ensure that, when the examination is administered to an in-
dividual with a disability that impairs sensory, manual, or 
speaking skills, the examination results accurately reflect the 
individual's aptitude or achievement level or whatever other 
factor the examination purports to measure, rather than re-
flecting the individual's impaired sensory, manual, or speak-
ing skills (except where those skills are the factors that the 
. . ) 62 
exammat10n purports to measure . 
57. See Pullin, supra note 11, at 804. 
58. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(2)(i) (2000). See also James F. Carr, Effects of the 
ADA On Licensing and Regulation of Professionals, 23 COLO. LAW 343 (1994) (discuss-
ing the ADA's key terms and the effects of the ADA on professional licensing and regu-
lation). 
59. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(ii) (2000). See also Deborah Piltch et a!., The Ameri-
cans With Disabilities Act and Professional Licensing, 17 MENTAL & PHYSICAL 
DISABILITY L. REP. 556, 557 (1993) (stating that the ADA was implemented to give the 
disabled the ability to compete with the non-disabled). 
60. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o) (2000). See also Piltch, supra note 59, at 557. 
61. See S. E. Phillips, Testing Condition Accommodations for Disabled Students, 
80 EDUC. L. REP. 9, 22 (1993). 
62. 28 C.F.R. § 36.309(b)(i) (2000). 
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However, an accommodation is not reasonable if it consti-
tutes an undue burden of hardship to provide it,63or if it re-
quires a fundamental alteration to the institution's program.64 
As stated, many of the phrases in the ADA are imprecise or 
ill-defined; these vague IJhrases have led to various interpreta-
tions by different courts.65 However, the Supreme Court has re-
cently given guidance by interpreting the ambiguous phrases 
and shedding light on the hazy definitions. 66 
IV. MITIGATION CASES 
The primary issue concerning students and the ADA is 
whether corrective and mitigating measures should be consid-
ered in determining a student's disabled status. The Supreme 
Court analogized the principles of employment disability to 
disabilities in the education setting in New York State Board of 
Law Examiners v. Bartlett.67 However, the Court did not dis-
cuss the facts of the case. Thus, it is likely that the Tenth Cir-
cuit's decision in McGuinness v. University of New Mexico 
School of Medicine68 represents how the Supreme Court would 
apply their holdings in Sutton and Murphy to disabilities in the 
educational setting.69 In both Sutton and Murphy, the Court 
63. See, e.g., 28 C.F.R. § 36.303 <0 (2000); Bonnie Poitras Tucker, Application of 
the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and Section 504 to Colleges and Universities: 
An Overview and Discussion of Special Issues Relating to Students, 23 J.C. & U.L. 1, 
14-15 (1996). 
64. See, e.g., 28 C.F.R. § 36.302(a) (2000); Tucker, supra note 63, at 15. 
65. See, e.g., Gilday v. Mecosta County, 124 F.3d 760, 767 (6th Cir. 1997) (holding 
that the ADA provides no protection for individuals whose impairment is fully miti-
gated); Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 130 F.3d 893, 902 (lOth Cir. 1997) (finding the 
determination of whether an individual's impairment substantially limits a major life 
activity should take into consideration mitigating or corrective measures utilized by 
the individual). But see Arnold v. United Parcel Serv. Inc., 136 F.3d 854, 864 (1st Cir. 
1998) (stating a disability should be assessed without regard to the availability of miti-
gating measures); Bartlett, 156 F.3d at 329 (2d Cir. 1998) (holding that mitigating 
measures should not be taken into account when determining if a person is substan-
tially limited in a major life activity). 
66. See, e.g., New York State Bd. of Law Exam'rs v. Bartlett, 119 S. Ct. 2388 
(1999); Murphy v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 119 S. Ct. 2133, 2136 (1999); Sutton, 119 S. 
Ct. at 2139. 
67. 119 S. Ct. 2388 (1999). 
68. 170 F.3d 974, cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 1357 (1999). 
69. See, e.g., Zukle v. University of California, 166 F.3d 1041, 1046-47 (9th Cir. 
1999) (analogizing employment discrimination with discrimination in the school con-
text); McGuinness, 170 F.3d at 978 (holding that the deciding principles of employment 
discrimination cases can be applied in the educational context); McPherson v. Michigan 
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found that disability in the employment context is gauged by 
the corrective measures taken by the disabled. 70 Similarly, the 
McGuinness Court found that disability in the educational con-
text is measured against the corrective actions taken by the 
disabled. 
A. Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc. 
In Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc.,71 the United States Su-
preme Court held that the determination of whether an indi-
vidual is disabled should be made with reference to measures 
that mitigate the individual's impairment, including, in this in-
stance, eyeglasses and contact lenses. 72 The Sutton case in-
volved myopic twin sisters who, without corrective lenses, could 
not see to conduct numerous activities such as driving a vehi-
cle, watching television, or shopping in public stores.73 How-
ever, with corrective measures, such as glasses or contact 
lenses, both sisters function identically to individuals without a 
similar impairment.74 The Court held that if the impairment is 
corrected it does not "substantially limit" a major life activity. 
The Court proffered several reasons for judging a person's 
disability based on their corrected or mitigated state. First, the 
Court worried that to view people in their uncorrected or un-
mitigated state would directly counter the ADA's requirement 
that each person be evaluated individually and not as a 
group. 75 Neither the medical name nor the diagnosis of the im-
pairment should determine whether an individual has a dis-
ability; rather, the effect of the impairment on the life of the 
individual should be the sole criterion when determining if that 
individual is disabled. 76 To allow otherwise would cause specu-
lation about a person's condition, which would lead to generali-
zations about an uncorrected impairment. 77 This grouping by 
High Sch. Athletic Ass'n, Inc., 119 F.3d 453, 460 (6th Cir. 1997) (finding that the deci-
sional principles of employment discrimination can be applied to ADA cases arising in 
education). 
70. See, e.g., Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2143; Murphy, 119 S. Ct. at 2137. 
71. 119 S. Ct. 2139 (1999). 
72. Id. at 2143. 
73. ld. 
74. ld. 
75. ld. at 2147. See also 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630, app. § 1630.2(j)(2) (2000) (requiring a 
case-by- case analysis to determine if an individual is "substantially limit[ed)"). 
76. Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2147. 
77. Id. 
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generalization would create a system in which a person would 
be treated as a member of a group of people with similar im-
pairments rather than as an individual with a distinct disabil-
ity. In turn, this grouping by generalizations would contradict 
the ADA's requirement of individualized inquiry. 78 Further, 
broad generalizations would cause speculation about a person's 
condition, which would be contrary to both the letter and the 
spirit of the ADA. 79 
Second, to allow a laundry list of generalized disabilities 
could lead to an anomalous result, where negative side effects 
suffered by an individual who takes mitigating measures could 
not be considered.80 Again, such generalizations go against the 
ADA's mandate that the determination of a disability be re-
viewed on a case-by-case basis.81 In addition, the use of correc-
tive devices does not, in and of itself, relieve a person's disabil-
ity.82 Rather, the determination depends on whether the 
limitations an individual with an impairment actually faces are 
in fact substantially limiting. 83 
Finally, the Court found that viewing a disability in its un-
corrected or unmitigated state would be over-inclusive and go 
against the intent of Congress.84 Congress found that "some 
43,000,000 Americans have one or more physical or mental 
disabilities, and this number is increasing as the population as 
a whole is growing older."85 If Congress wanted the ADA to in-
clude uncorrected or unmitigated disabilities, it would have in-
corporated the report from the National Council on Disability. 
This report estimated that over 160 million disabled people live 
in America.86 This number accounted for all conditions that im-
pair the health or normal functional abilities of an individual. 87 
Included in this number were: 100 million people who need cor-
rective lenses to see properly, 28 million hearing-impaired 




81. Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2147. See also 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630, app. § 1630.2(j) (1998) 
(stating that the determination of disability must be made on a case-by-case basis). 
82. Sutton, 119 S.Ct. at 2149. 
83. ld. 
84. ld. at 2147. 
85. ld. 
86. Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2149. 
87. ld. at 2148. 
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blood pressure.88 Because Congress did not mention such a high 
number of people in passing the statute, it seems evident that 
Congress intended to restrict ADA coverage to those whose im-
pairments could not be mitigated by corrective measures.89 
The Sutton Court determined that the petitioners were not 
disabled because with corrective lenses their visual acuity was 
20/20. Thus, the Court found that the petitioners functioned 
identically to individuals without a similar impairment.90 The 
Court held that to be regarded as substantially limited in the 
major life activity of working: 
one must be precluded from more than one type of job, a spe-
cialized job, or a particular job of choice. If jobs utilizing an 
individual's skills ... are available, one is not precluded from a 
substantial class of jobs. Similarly, if a host of different types 
of jobs are available, one is not precluded from a broad range 
f . b 91 0 JO S. 
Thus, the court stated that a person's inability to perform a 
single, particular job does not constitute a substantial limita-
tion in the major life activity of working.92 After Sutton, the 
Court ruled similarly in the following case where an employer 
fired an employee with high blood pressure. 
B. Murphy v. United Parcel Service, Inc. 
In Murphy v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 93 the Supreme 
Court held that the decision of whether a person has a disabil-
ity is made with reference to the mitigating measures em-
ployed by that person.94 In Murphy, a truck mechanic alleged 
that his employer discharged him because of his high blood 
95 pressure. In an unmedicated state, Murphy's blood pressure 
measured approximately 250/160.96 With medication, however, 
Murphy's hypertension did not significantly restrict his activi-
ties and, in general, he functioned normally and engaged in ac-
88. !d. at 2149. 
89. !d. 
90. !d. 
91. Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2151. 
92. !d. See also 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3)(i) (2000). 
93. 119 S. Ct. 2133 (1999). 
94. !d. at 2137. 
95. !d. at 2136. 
96. !d. 
98 B.Y.U. EDUCATION AND LAW JOURNAL [2001 
tivities that other persons normally do.97 Murphy alleged his 
hypertension limited him in the major life activities of "run-
ning, eating, exercising, breathing, hearing, and seeing."98 
In determining whether Murphy was disabled under the 
ADA, the Supreme Court held that it must consider his hyper-
tension in a medicated state. The Court found that Murphy 
was not substantially limited in any major life activity.99 Citing 
its decision in Sutton, the Supreme Court held that Murphy's 
high blood pressure did not substantially limit him in any ma-
jor life activity100 because, when medicated, Murphy "functions 
normally doing everyday activity that an everyday person 
does."101 The Court also reiterated its holding in Sutton by find-
ing that Murphy was not "substantially limited" in the major 
life activity of working because Murphy was only precluded 
from being a mechanic in a particular field and was not pre-
cluded from a broad class of jobs. 102 The Court's requirement 
that a person be precluded from a broad class of jobs also car-
ries over to the area of education. 
C. Bartlett v. New York State Board of Law Examiners 
In Bartlett v. New York State Board of Law Examiners, 103 
the Second Circuit determined that, "disability should be as-
sessed without regard to the availability of mitigating meas-
ures."104 In this case, Dr. Marilyn Bartlett alleged that the New 
York State Board of Law Examiners (Board) discriminated 
against her by not allowing her reasonable bar exam accommo-
dations.105 Dr. Bartlett suffered from a cognitive disorder that 
impaired her ability to read. 106 Without accommodations, Bart-
lett failed the bar examination on four separate occasions. 107 
Also, after receiving the accommodation of extra time on her 
97. Id. 
98. Murphy v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 946 F.Supp. 872, 875 (D. Kan. 1996) (dis-
cussing testimony of petitioner's physician as taken from the trial court's record). 
99. Murphy, 119 S. Ct. at 2136. 
100. ld. at 2139. 
101. Id. at 2137. 
102. ld. at 2139. 
103. 156 F.3d 321, 329 (2d Cir. 1998). 
104. ld. 
105. ld. 
106. ld. at 324. 
107. Id. 
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fifth examination she still failed to pass. 108 Bartlett brought 
suit against the Board demanding that she be given reasonable 
accommodations (i.e., no time limitation) on the bar examina-
tion.Io9 
Although she had a history of self-accommodation that al-
lowed her to achieve average reading skills, the Second Circuit 
found Bartlett was limited in the major life activitl of reading 
and learning as compared to the average person.11 In its find-
ing, the Court determined mitigating measures should not be 
considered when determining whether a person is disabled.m 
However, the United States Supreme Court vacated the Second 
Circuit's holding and remanded the case to be determined in 
light of its rulings in Sutton and Murphy. 112 Unfortunately, the 
Court did not analyze the facts in Bartlett. Nevertheless, in 
McGuinness v. University of New Mexico School of Medicine, 113 
the Tenth Circuit followed the Supreme Court's holdings. The 
case illustrates how the definition of "substantially limited" 
applies to ADA claims in an educational setting. 114 
D. McGuinness v. University of New Mexico School of 
Medicine 
In McGuinness v. University of New Mexico School of Medi-
cine, 115 the Tenth Circuit held that impairments that are lim-
ited to certain academic subjects are not disabilities under the 
ADA. 116 In McGuinness, a first-year medical student was re-
quired to take a course in biochemistry. 117 The student suffered 
from anxiety attacks when taking tests related to chemistry or 
math. 118 The student notified his professor about his anxietx9 but insisted that he needed no test-taking accommodations. 1 
108. Bartlett, 156 F.3d at 325. 
109. Id. 
110. Id. at 329. 
111. Id. 
112. New York State Bd. of Law Exam'rs v. Bartlett, 119 8. Ct. 2388 (1999) (vacat-
ing lower court's holding and remanding the case). 
113. 170 F.3d 974 (lOth Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 119 8. Ct. 1357 (1999). 
114. Id. 
115. Id. 
116. Id. (holding that an anxiety disorder that manifests itself in limited circum-
stances does not constitute a disability under the ADA). 
117. Id. at 976. 
118. Id. at 977. 
119. Id. 
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Unfortunately, the student did not receive a passing grade and 
refused to take the required make-up exam. Instead, he filed 
suit in federal district court against the University of New 
Mexico School of Medicine (UNM), alleging violations of the 
ADA for failure to reasonably accommodate his test anxiety. 120 
The district court granted summary judgement in favor of 
UNM because the student did not prove that he was disabled 
under the ADA. 121 The student appealed and the Tenth Circuit 
affirmed the district court's holding.122 
The Tenth Circuit's holding was similar to those proffered 
by the Supreme Court in Sutton and Murphy. The Tenth Cir-
cuit held that an anxiety disorder that manifests itself only 
during chemistry and mathematics tests is limited and does 
not constitute a disability under the ADA. 123 That Court found 
the ADA's definition of substantial limitations on "working" 
should not control the outcome of the case, rather, the Court 
posited that the "deciding principles of employment discrimina-
tion cases can be applied to ADA claims in the educational con-
text."124 Like the Supreme Court decisions in Sutton and Mur-
phy, the Tenth Circuit held that an individual did not have an 
impairment if his disability did not prevent him from perform-
ing a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs in various classes as 
compared to the average person having comparable training, 
skills, and abilities. 125 By analogy, the student in McGuinness 
needed to demonstrate that his anxiety impeded his perform-
ance in a wide variety of disciplines. 126 He did not do this. The 
Court held that the student did not meet the threshold for dis-
ability because, "[a]n impairment limited to specific stressful 
situations .. .is not a disability."127 
The cases of Sutton, Murphy, Bartlett, and McGuinness all 
stand for the principle that a person is not "substantially lim-
ited" if a disability can be mitigated and if the disability does 
not limit a person in a "major life activity." Thus, it is neces-
120. McGuinness, 183 F.3d at 1173 (discussing claim preclusion and the proceed-
ings of the original McGuinness case). 
121. ld. at 1174. 
122. ld. 
123. McGuinness, 170 F.3d at 977. 
124. !d. at 978. 
125. ld. 
126. ld. 
127. ld. at 980. 
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sary for schools to incorporate these holdings into their policies 
toward accommodating the learning disabled. 
V. THE ADA's APPLICATION TO LAW SCHOOLS 
Post-graduate schools should set forth policies that preclude 
students from claiming an ADA learning disability if such a 
disability can be mitigated through medication or other correc-
tive measures. In order to fulfill the ADA's individual inquiry 
requirement and to avoid generalizations about the learning 
disabled, schools should tailor accommodations to the specific 
needs of the learning disabled individual. 
The apprehensions that the Supreme Court posited in Sut-
ton are extremely prevalent today. Individuals with grave 
physical handicaps comprise only a small portion of the people 
who claim special privilege under the federal disability laws. 128 
Between 1990 and 1993, the number of non-accommodated 
students taking the LSAT steadily declined, whereas the num-
ber of students re~uesting accommodations increased by ap-
proximately 19.5%. 9 Further, the American Council on Educa-
tion reported that the percentage of students with learning 
disabilities has grown the fastest, increasing from about 15% to 
25% of all students with disabilities. 130 Also, the learning dis-
abled law student is a member of the largest growing group of 
handicapped students in post-secondary education. 131 According 
to 1996 EEOC figures, only 14% of the disabled-the deaf, 
blind, and paraplegic-filed complaints. 132 Additionally, a sur-
vey of eighty law schools discovered that accommodation re-
quests were granted 98% of the time. 133 Furthermore, only 41% 
of the requests for accommodations came from the traditionally 
disabled, whereas 53.6% of the requests were from the learning 
128. See Shalit, supra note 19. 
129. See Wightman, supra note 6, at 12 (showing that from 1990 to 1993 the num-
ber of non-accommodated test takers decreased approximately 4.35% while the number 
of accommodated test takers increased approximately 19.5%). 
130. See McCusker, supra note 12, at 622. 
131. See Alfreda A. Sellers Diamond, L.D. Law: The Learning Disabled Law Stu-
dent as Part of a Diverse Law School Environment, 22 S.U. L. REN. 69, 72 (stating it is 
estimated that 6% of the law school population isJearning disabled). 
132. See Shalit, supra note 19. 
133. See Donald Stone, The Impact of the Americans with Disabilities Act on Legal 
Education and Academic Modifications for Disabled Law Students: An Empirical 
Study, 44 U. KAN. L. REV. 567, 569 (1996). 
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disabled. 134 Of these requests, 82% of the schools allowed learn-
ing disabled students time-and-a-half to double time on ex-
ams.135 The only proof that the learning disabled were required 
to provide for accommodations were recent letters136 from a 
family doctor, a psychologist, a psychiatrist, an independent 
examiner, or a school examiner, stating the student's disability 
and the accommodations requested. 137 
VI. PROPOSED REMEDIES 
Many law students spend hundreds, if not thousands, of 
dollars preparing for the LSAT, the first year oflaw school, and 
the bar exam. If a student is willing to expend such resources 
on getting into school, passing classes, and passing the bar, 
what stops a student from using the ADA as a further supple-
ment to succeed? Schools can prevent students from using the 
ADA as a learning supplement by incorporating measures such 
as flagging of scores, professorial input, and independent test-
ing into their ADA policies so that the potential for abuse will 
be virtually eliminated. 
A. Flagging Scores 
Students who receive extra time on their examinations 
should have a notation put on their transcripts indicating that 
the examination was taken with accommodations. In a world 
where honors organizations (i.e., Law Review, Moot Court, 
Honors Fraternity, etc.) and GPA can be the difference between 
working for the best firms and being self-employed, it is neces-
sary that students with correctable maladies have a disincen-
tive to use the ADA as a tool for advancement. 
Law Services, the agency that administers the LSAT, regu-
larly grants accommodations, usually in the form of extra time, 
to learning disabled takers of the LSAT. 138 Although they allow 
learning disabled students the accommodation of extra time, 
134. ld. (finding that only 25 of 1145 student requests for reasonable accommoda-
tions were denied). 
135. !d. at 598. 
136. !d. at 600 (stating that "recent" meant three years on average). 
137. !d. 
138. See, e.g., Wightman, supra note 6, at 43; Eichhorn, supra note 5, at 46; LAW 
SCHOOL ADMISSION COUNCIL, 1999-2000 LSAT & LSDAS REGISTRATION AND 
INFORMATION BOOK 5 (1999). 
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Law Services advises candidates that scores will be flagged. 139 
In particular, Law Services advises candidates: 
[I]f you receive additional test time as an accommodation for 
your disability, we [Law Services] will send a statement with 
your LSDAS Law School Reports advising that your score(s) 
should be interpreted with great sensitivity and flexibility. 
Scores earned with additional test time are reported indi-
vidually and will not be averaged with standard-time scores 
or other nonstandard-time scores. Percentile ranks of non-
standard-time scores are not available and will not be re-
140 ported. 
The reason Law Services flags the scores of those who re-
ceive extra time is to inform admitting schools that the accom-
modated LSAT score cannot be relied upon to provide indica-
tions of first-year performance in law school. 141 
A 1993 study by Law Services showed a tendency toward 
over-prediction of law school success for learning disabled 
LSAT-takers who had received testing accommodations be-
cause the speeded nature of the LSAT may give accommodated 
test takers a several point advantage over non-accommodated 
test takers. 142 This advantage can be seen when comparing test 
scores of the accommodated against those of the non-
accommodated. For example, 30% of learning disabled test tak-
ers earned LSAT scores of 160 or higher, whereas 18% of the 
143 
non-accommodated test takers scored 160 or higher. Further, 
the accommodated student had an average LSAT score of 154 
versus the non-accommodated student who averaged a 150 on 
the LSAT. 144 Dr. Warren Willingham, a psychometrician145 with 
139. See LAW SCHOOL ADMISSION COUNCIL, 1999-2000 LSAT & LSDAS REGISTRA-
TION AND INFORMATION BOOK 6 (1999). But see Pullin, supra note 11, at 816 (stating 
that the use of flagged scores by the testing industry may be a tenuous professional 
practice). 
140. See LAW SCHOOL ADMISSION COUNCIL, 1999-2000 LSAT & LSDAS REGISTRA-
TION AND INFORMATION BOOK 6 (1999). 
141. See, e.g., Wightman, supra note 6, at 52; Eichorn, supra note 5, at 49; Pullin, 
supra note 11, at 826 (arguing that the testing industry uses flags because of its inabil-
ity to demonstrate the validity and accuracy of test scores for all the different types of 
accommodations offered to students with disabilities). 
142. See Wightman, supra note 6, at 44-45, 52. But see Eichhorn, supra note 5, at 
47 (stating that the validity of the study has been called into question because it failed 
to track whether the test takers later received accommodations in law school). 
143. See Wightman, supra note 6, at 21. 
144. !d. at 20. 
145. See TABER'S, supra note 1, at 1592 (stating a psychometrician is a person who 
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the Educational Testing Service, found similar results when 
comparing Scholastic Assessment Test (SAT)146 scores of the 
learning disabled and the non-learning disabled. Dr. Willing-
ham's study found the college grades of learning disabled stu-
dents were substantially over-predicted when these students 
were allowed to take the SAT in an untimed or extended-time 
basis. 147 Another study undertaken jointly by the College 
Board, Education Testing Services (ETS), and the Graduate 
Record Examination Board (GRE) found the same results. 148 
This four-year study of the SAT and GRE tests found clear evi-
dence that future educational performance was over-~redicted 
for students who received extra time on their tests. 49 These 
studies suggest that, "providing longer amounts of time may 
raise scores beyond the level appropriate to compensate for the 
d . b'l't ,150 1sa 1 1 y. 
In light of these findings, schools should flag transcripts 
and tests of those students who receive extra time on their ex-
ams to inform honors organizations that the student did not 
participate in the traditional end-of-semester timed examina-
tion.151 Like the LSAT guidelines, such a system would allow 
honors organizations the ability to interpret the scores with 
sensitivity and flexibility toward the learning disabled. How-
ever, no organization should use the information to deny mem-
bership to a disabled student because such use of the informa-
tion would be discriminatory and would violate the ADA 
'd 1' 152 gm e mes. 
is skilled in psychometry which is the measurement of psychological variables, such as 
intelligence, aptitude, behavior, and emotional variables). See also Michael K. McKin-
ney, The Impact of the Americans with Disabilities Act on the Bar Examination Process: 
The Applicability of Title II and Title III to the Learning Disabled, 26 CUMB. L. REV. 
669, 682-83 (1995-1996) (stating that psychometricians believe that permitting addi-
tional amounts of time on exams could alter the construct and predictive validity of the 
test). 
146. See Shalit, supra note 19 (noting the SAT is a standardized test that esti-
mates how well a particular applicant will perform in college). 
147. Id. See also Phillips, supra note 61, at 10. 
148. See Pullin, supra note 11, at 817. 
149. Id. 
150. See Phillips, supra note 61, at 10. 
151. Univ. of Michigan, 2 NAT'L DISAB. L. REP. 302 (Oct. 18, 1991) (stating the 
mere fact that a school has notice that a student's test scores were achieved under non-
standard conditions is not discriminatory). 
152. See State Univ. of N.Y. Health Science Ctr. at Brooklyn-College of Medicine 
(NY), 5 NAT'L DISABILITY L. REP. 77 (Aug. 18, 1993) (holding that universities may not 
devalue scores of individuals who take the MCAT under non-standard conditions). See 
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Schools should allow professors the opportunity to incorpo-
rate a balancing test when grading accommodated scores 
against non-accommodated scores. After grading all the tests 
together, the professor should be informed which exams were 
accommodated and the professor should be given the opportu-
nity to compare the different works. If the accommodated test 
is on par with those scores of the non-accommodated exams 
then the grade should stand without a flag. However, if it 
would be unfair to compare the accommodated tests with the 
examinations of those who participated in the stressful, time 
constrained group then the transcript should be flagged. To de-
termine whether a grade should be flagged, the professor 
should consider some of the following questions: 
1) Will the test score of the accommodated student have a dif-
ferent interpretation from that of other students tested with-
out the accommodations? Are the scores comparable? 
2) Are the format of the test questions or the conditions being 
altered a part of the skill or knowledge being tested? 
3) Would allowing the accommodations for all students help 
them achieve higher scores and alter the inference made from 
their test scores? 
4) Can valid and reliable procedures and appeals be estab-
lished for determining which students will be given the re-
quested accommodation? 
5) Should the disabled student be given any responsibility for 
adaptation to existing testing conditions?153 
Accommodated students with flagged transcripts should be 
required to write-on, rather than grade-on to organizations 
that require a minimum GPA, such as Law Review. To be fair, 
the write-on requirements would take into account the stu-
dent's disability, thereby allowing the student the same ac-
commodations that were received on the examination. This 
would further the ADA's goal of placing those with disabilities 
on an equal footing with those who are not disabled, instead of 
also Milani, supra note 41, at 998 (showing that universities violate the ADA when 
they place lower weight on standardized test scores achieved under conditions designed 
to accommodate disabilities). But see Pullin, supra note 11, at 824 (stating that the 
practice of flagging may unfairly stigmatize disabled students). 
153. Phillips, supra note 61, at 27. See also McKinney, supra note 145, at 684. 
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giVmg the learning disabled advantages over others. 154 This 
balancing test is equitable, not punitive, since it would meet 
the ADA requirement of individual inquiry by being imple-
mented on an exam-by-exam basis, thereby rejecting blanket 
policies and eliminating generalizations about those with 
learning disabilities. Also, the balancing test would allow those 
students who truly are learning disabled to get the help they 
need without being stigmatized for receiving assistance. Fur-
thermore, the professor's comparison of examinations would 
not jeopardize the hallowed anonymous grading system of most 
schools, since the professor would only be informed that the 
exam was accommodated and not who the accommodated stu-
dent was. Thus, flagging of scores would lead to parity and 
fairness since students would be less inclined to claim suspect 
disabilities. 
B. Professorial Input 
Law school is an environment where professors teach and 
construct exams geared toward providing students with the 
tools necessary for the practice of law. Therefore, it is of para-
mount importance that professors be allowed to voice an opin-
ion as to the kinds of accommodations provided to learning dis-
abled students. Unfortunately, the majority of law schools do 
not consult professors for input into the types of accommoda-
tions that should be given to students with learning disabili-
ties. 155 In fact, a survey of eighty law schools showed that 69% 
of the time professors have no input about accommodations. 156 
Compared to professional diagnosticians, the law faculty 
may lack the training and expertise for determining the extent 
of a person's disability. However, professors are qualified to de-
termine the reasonable accommodations that should be pro-
vided to ensure fair and equitable treatment. 157 Traditionally, a 
law student's grade depends almost entirely on one examina-
154. D'Amico v. New York Bd. of Law Exam'rs, 813 F.Supp. 217, 221 (W.D.N.Y. 
1993) (holding that plaintiffs serious visual disability required a reasonable accommo-
dation and that such accommodation would not be an unfair advantage because it 
would allow plaintiff to read at a normal rate). 
155. See Stone, supra note 133, at 598. 
156. Id. (showing that, when it comes to accommodations, professors make the fi-
nal decision in 3% of cases, get consulted in 28% of cases, and have no input in 69% of 
cases). 
157. Id. at 576. 
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tion where the student exhibits the qualities thought to be im-
portant to succeed in the legal profession.158 The professor is 
best situated to evaluate and establish the methods (i.e., case 
study, problems, hypotheticals, etc.) most suited to developing 
the knowledge and skills that the professor feels must be ac-
quired by the student, both for the Rurpose of the course and 
for the purpose of practicing law .1 9 By logical inference, it 
would seem that the facilitator of knowledge and the creator of 
the exam would also be one of the best resources for ascertain-
ing what accommodations could be implemented without de-
valuing the course objectives. Furthermore, input from profes-
sors would not threaten the anonymity of students because the 
professor would only give insight into how different accommo-
dations could affect the curriculum; therefore, the professor 
would have no first-hand knowledge of who the accommodated 
student is. Since they provide students with the knowledge and 
experience needed for practice, the law faculty should be con-
sulted for input on the appropriateness of accommodations as 
they pertain to exams. Also, professorial input would not be 
violative of the ADA's guidelines since the consultation would 
be done generally and anonymously. 
C. Independent Testing 
To ensure uniformity and fairness and to prevent students 
from shopping for favorable evaluators of disabilities, 160 schools 
should require disabled students to submit to school-
administered psychological or medical examinations to docu-
ment any disabilities. If a school-administered examination is 
cost-prohibitive then schools should require independent test-
ing to document disabilities. 
Currently, the majority of law schools require some form of 
documentation from the student's own psychologist, psychia-
trist, or doctor. 161 On average, the documentation must have 
been obtained within the last three years and it must request 
specific accommodations. 162 There are a great variety of people 
who have taken on the role of diagnostician, and these diagnos-
158. See Eichhorn, supra note 5, at 57. 
159. See Smith, supra note 36, at 72-73. 
160. See Stone, supra note 133, at 576. 
161. Id. at 600. 
162. Id. at 578. 
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ticians use a wide variety of definitions, testing techniques, and 
163 
reporting methods. Thus, schools should refer students to 
school administered psychological or medical examinations to 
prevent biased results and to establish uniform criteria that 
are based on specific, identified tests. Rarely, if ever, should a 
student's hand-picked evaluator be the sole judge for granting 
accommodations since some students may shop for favorable 
evaluations, 164 and because "some diagnosticians may, con-
sciously or unconsciously, skew their testing in order to achieve 
particular results."165 Further, schools should refrain from hav-
ing blanket policies dictating particular accommodations for 
any individuals with particular disabilities (i.e., where disabil-
ity "X" is given accommodation "Y''). 166 Since blanket policies 
violate the ADA's requirement of individual inquiry, 167 schools 
should do an individualized assessment to determine if an ex-
aminee with a learning disability needs an accommodation, 
and if so, which accommodation(s) would best meet the indi-
vidual's needs. 168 
For determining independent testing guidelines, schools 
could look to the criteria set forth by the Texas Board of Law 
Examiners (TBLE). The TBLE provides non-standard testing 
accommodations to those individuals who have a permanent 
disability which substantially limits a major life activity. 169 
Further, the TBLE requires a comprehensive psycho-
educational or neuro-psychological assessment that demon-
strates the impact of the impairment of an examinee's ability to 
163. See Eichorn, supra note 5, at 36 (quoting Dean Arthur Frakt of Widener Uni-
versity School of Law, who reported seeing declines of 20%-25% in I.Q. scores when a 
student was tested by a privately retained diagnostician and then by a neutral or disin-
terested professional). See also Phillips, supra note 61, at 22 (showing that whether a 
student is classified as learning disabled depends to a large extent on the method used 
to identifY the disability and that the term learning disability has become a catchall 
category that makes it difficult to differentiate the learning disabled from students who 
are merely low achievers). 
164. See Rothstein, supra note 27, at 39 (stating that some admissions profession-
als are concerned that everyone can find someone who will verify the existence of a 
learning disability). 
165. See Eichorn, supra note 5, at 36. 
166. See Piltch, supra note 59, at 557. 
167. See, e.g., 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630, app. § 1630.2(j) (1998) (requiring analysis of dis-
ability on a case-by-case basis); Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2147 (determining that individual 
inquiry is required where disabilities are concerned). 
168. Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2147. 
169. TEXAS BOARD OF LAW EXAMINERS, Rules Governing Admission to the Bar of 
Texas, at 33 (Dec. 21, 1998). 
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perform on all testing components of the Texas exam under 
standard time conditions. 170 Also, the independent documenta-
tion must include both diagnostic information and an explana-
tion of the current manifestations or functional limitations of 
the condition. 171 The assessment should be thorough enough to 
demonstrate whether or not a major life activity is substan-
tially limited (i.e., the extent, duration, and impact of the con-
dition).172 Whether a law school uses an in-house evaluator or 
an independent evaluator, the school should always take into 
account a student's history of testing accommodation and any 
mitigating factors that may have effectuated a change in a stu-
dent's disability classification. By using independent tests and 
reviewing a student's history of accommodation, schools can set 
standards that are applicable to the learning disabled and in 
line with the mandate of the ADA. Also, the use of independent 
testing would allow schools to tailor accommodations to the 
specific needs of the student, thereby meeting the ADA's re-
quirement of individual inquiry. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
The ADA is not designed "to allow individuals to advance to 
professional positions through a back door. Rather, it is aimed 
at rebuilding the threshold of a profession's front door so that 
capable people with unrelated disabilities are not barred ... 
from entering."173 Unfortunately, schools are allowing people to 
advance through the proverbial back door by granting accom-
modations to those whose conditions can be mitigated or cor-
rected. Therefore, it is of great import for law schools to review 
their policies toward the learning disabled. In light of the Su-
preme Court's holdings in Sutton, Murphy and Bartlett, stu-
dents who have medical or physical "disabilities" that can be 
mitigated should not be allowed to invoke the Americans with 
Disabilities Act (ADA) to acquire special accommodations. Fur-
thermore, if a student does invoke the ADA, she should be re-
quired to call upon an independent testing center to verify the 
disability, her scores should be subject to flagging, and her 
170. !d. at 34. 
171. !d. 
172. !d. at 35. 
173. Price, 966 F. Supp. at 421-22. 
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scores should be subject to professorial review. If schools would 
implement such remedies, stories like those of Di Sabled could 
be averted, and the prejudices and stereotypes about the dis-
abled will be assuaged. 
